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Abstract
When selling information, sometimes the seller can increase the revenue by giving away
some partial information to change the buyers’ belief about the information product, so the
buyers may be more willing to purchase. This work studies the general problem of advertising
information products by revealing some partial information. We consider buyers who need to
make a decision, the outcome of which depends on the state of the world that is unknown to
the buyers. There is an information seller who has access to the state of the world. The seller
can advertise the information by revealing some partial information. We assume that the seller
chooses a long-term advertising strategy and then commits to it. The buyers decide whether to
purchase the full information product after seeing the partial information. The seller’s goal is
to maximize the expected revenue. We study the problem in two settings.
1. The seller targets the buyers of a certain type. In this case, we prove that finding the
optimal advertising strategy is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a function,
which is NP-hard in general. Based on this observation, we prove some properties of
the optimal mechanism, which allow us to solve for the optimal mechanism by a convex
program (of exponential size in general, polynomial size for special cases). We also prove
some interesting characterizations of the optimal mechanisms based on these properties.
2. For the general problem when the seller faces buyers of different types and only knows the
distribution of their types, it is NP-hard to find a constant factor approximation. We thus
look at special cases and provide an approximation algorithm that finds an ε-suboptimal
mechanism when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of buyers who will make
the purchase.
1 Introduction
The trading of information constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies.
The rapid spread of Internet in the past few decades has provided easy accesses to a large volume
of online data, which stimulated the dynamically-growing markets for information. Information is
being sold under a large variety of forms: newspapers and magazines, consulting services, database
access, industry reports and credit reports, etc.
The nature of information product varies greatly from the traditional commodity products.
A lot of effort has been made to understand the optimal strategy of selling information. It has
been long observed that revealing partial information about the information products may greatly
increase the subsequent likelihood of purchase: movies have trailers, online newspapers and maga-
zines provide free beginning paragraphs or pages, dataset platforms allow the potential buyers to
browse the datasets and give free random sample of the data, etc. Revealing partial information
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decreases the amount of information that is later being sold, but in return, it may change people’s
opinion about the product and increase some buyers’ interests in the information product.
In this work, we study the general problem of advertising information products by revealing
some partial information. Following the standard modeling of information in economics literature,
we represent an information product as a random variable that represents the state of the world. A
piece of partial information is represented by a signal that is correlated with the state of the world.
The value of a piece of information is determined by the decision problem that this information will
be used in, as in [9, 10, 6, 15, 1, 11]. For example, consider a flight tracker which wants to sell the
information of flight delays to travelers. In this problem, the information being sold (or the state
of the world) is the flight delay. To advertise the information, the flight tracker can send out some
partial information, e.g. whether the delay is longer than six hours, which is a signal correlated
with the state of the world. If a traveler purchases the information, he may use it to update his
travel plan. The information’s value for a traveler is determined by his expected gain in replanning.
We consider a seller who decides a long-term advertising strategy (e.g. tell the travelers whether
the delay is longer than six hours, provide free random sample of the datasets) and follows that
strategy thereafter. The buyers do not have direct access to the state of the world, but they may
have partial observations (e.g. the weather) and thus hold personal beliefs about the state of the
world. The buyers decide whether to purchase the full information after seeing the advertising
signal, for example, decides whether to pay 5 dollars for the exact delay after knowing that the
delay is longer than six hours.
In this work, we focus on the interaction between the seller and the buyer through the advertising
strategy but omit the consideration of advertising cost. We assume that the cost difference between
different advertising strategies is relatively small compared to the seller’s revenue.
We will consider two settings: (1) The seller targets a group of buyers of a certain type. This
can be applied to the case when the majority of the buyers share a common belief and have the
same goal. We study this simplified situation to understand the hardness of the problem and gain
some insight into the optimal advertising strategy. (2) The seller faces buyers of different types
and only knows the distribution of their types. This is the most general setting for our problem.
1.1 Our Results
In this work, we propose and formulate the optimal advertising problem for information product.
We first consider the simple case when the seller targets a group of buyers of a specific type (the
type means the buyer’s prior belief and utility function). Even in this case, finding the optimal
advertising rule is NP-hard in general.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). When the seller targets a group of buyers of a specific type, solving the
optimal advertising mechanism is NP-hard.
Despite the hardness of the problem, we characterize the optimal advertising as finding the
concave closure of a function and present an exponential-size convex program that solves the optimal
mechanism. Furthermore, when the information product has only a few possible realizations (e.g.
the weather is going to be sunny/cloudy/rainy...), or the buyers face a decision problem with only a
few options, the size of the convex program will be small and thus it will be efficiently computable.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). When the seller targets a group of buyers of a specific type, solving
the optimal advertising mechanism is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a function. The
optimal mechanism can be solved by an exponential-size convex program. When the state of the
world has a constant number of possible realizations, or the buyers face a decision problem with a
constant number of options, the convex program will have a polynomial size.
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The function, whose concave closure indicates the optimal advertising mechanism, is the product
of two components. The first component is what we call the likelihood ratio function, which captures
the difference between the seller’s belief and the buyer’s belief about the likelihood of an event.
The second component is the cost of uncertainty function, which represents how much the buyer
is willing to pay for the information product based on his belief. We prove some properties of the
optimal advertising mechanism by analyzing the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty in the
optimal mechanism, which may be of independent interest. These properties allow us to drastically
reduce the design space to a finite set, and fortunately we can then formulate a convex program
to solve the problem. In addition, we also use these properties to gain insight into the optimal
mechanism (Theorem 1.3) and find characterizations of the optimal mechanisms in special cases
(Theorem 1.4).
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). When the buyers face a decision problem with only a few options, the
seller can reveal a lot of partial information to optimally advertise the (remaining) information,
the fewer options the buyers face, the more information the seller can reveal freely.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). When the state of the world is binary, the optimal mechanism has a
simple characterization and can be found by simple arithmetic computation.
For the general problem when the seller faces buyers of different types and only knows the
distribution of their types, the problem becomes more challenging because it is more difficult for
the seller to choose the best price (after the advertising). In consequence, the optimal mechanism
is not only hard to solve, but also hard to approximate.
Theorem 1.5 (Informal). When the buyers’ types are drawn from a known distribution, it is
NP-hard to find a constant-factor approximation for our optimal information advertising problem.
Nevertheless, we show that in some special cases when it is not too hard to predict the possible
types of buyers who will make the purchase, it is possible to find an ε-suboptimal mechanism by a
linear program.
Theorem 1.6 (Informal). When the buyers’ types are drawn from a known distribution, and the
set of buyer types that will finally purchase the information has polynomially many possibilities, we
can find an ε-suboptimal mechanism within running time polynomial in 1/ε and the input size.
The theorem can be used for some important special cases, for example, when the buyer’s
type space is relatively small, or when the information has binary realizations. This ε-suboptimal
mechanism can be solved by an LP.
1.2 Related Work
Markets for information and data have attracted an increasing amount of attention recently. We
refer the readers to [4] for an overview of the vast literature. In parallel with the analysis of
competitive markets of information (see [23] for an overview) and the study of data intermediaries [4,
5], our work falls into the category of a monopoly information holder directly selling information
to the buyers. In contrast to some works that focus on specific information product, e.g. selling
cookies [3] and selling datasets [19], we consider selling information in a general framework, which
makes our work most relevant to [14, 6, 1, 11]. What makes our work different from the previous
ones is that we consider a seller who can only use posted price mechanism with a single price. The
previous works [14, 6, 1, 11] all consider designing a menu of different information with different
prices. The size of the optimal menu is as large as the type space (due to the use of the revelation
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principle). [1, 11] actually consider a seller that can interact with the buyer in multiple rounds.
Although larger mechanisms give the seller more power to extract revenue, they are also more
difficult to implement and participate in. Therefore in this work, we consider the design of simple
mechanisms for selling information, in which the seller just posts a price for the full revelation of
information (menu size equal to one), but can partially reveal some relevant information before the
sale to promote the information product.
There is also a vast recent literature on information design that studies how different information
disclosure rules influence the outcomes of games in different settings (see [7]). A particularly relevant
topic is Bayesian persuasion [17, 12], especially the public persuasion problem [13, 24]. In Bayesian
persuasion, there is a sender and a receiver. The sender wants to persuade the receiver to take
some actions by choosing a signal (or in our words, choosing some partial information) to reveal
to the receiver. One may think that our problem is just a persuasion problem because our goal is
basically to persuade the buyer to buy the information. The key difference between our problem
and Bayesian persuasion is that: in Bayesian persuasion, the sender only cares about the receiver’s
action after seeing the signal; but in our problem, what the seller cares is the revenue, which
depends on not only the signal and the buyer’s action but also the price chosen in the mechanism.
This makes our problem much more challenging than the persuasion problem. We also want to
point out a work [22] that studies a quite different information disclosure problem but has a very
close underlying mathematical model. Actually their problem can be seen as a special case of ours.
We discuss this in Appendix C.
It is worth noting that there is a fundamental difference between advertising regular goods
(see [2] for an overview) and advertising information products. Providing additional information
about regular goods will not make any change to the goods themselves. But advertising information
product may change the information product itself as revealing relevant information may decrease
the amount of information that is finally being sold.
2 Model
We consider the setting with a monopolist information seller and information buyers who need to
make a decision based on the information held by the seller. The information being sold is the
state of the world ω ∈ Ω = {1, . . . , n}, which is drawn from a commonly known distributin µ(ω).
Each day, a new state of the world ω will be realized and some information buyers will come.
The information buyers need to choose an action a ∈ A. A buyer’s utility u(ω, a) depends on his
action a and the state of the world ω on that day. The buyers cannot directly observe ω of that
day, but they may have their own partial observations and thus may hold personal beliefs about
the state of the world (which can be different from µ(ω)). We denoted by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ ∆Ω the buyer’s
personal belief, which is a distribution over Ω. We assume the set of possible personal beliefs
Θ ⊆ ∆Ω is a finite set. In the work, we also call θ the type of the buyer. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the utility function is normalized so that u(ω, a) ∈ [0, 1].1
The information seller has access to the realized state of the world ω every day. The seller needs
to decide a long-term strategy to sell the information of ω. We assume the seller can only sell the
information by a posted price mechanism with a single price, that is, set a price for telling the
buyers the value of ω. But before selling the information, the seller can advertise the information
of ω by sending out some partial information, or more formally, the seller can send a signal that
1The case that different types of buyers have different action sets and different utility functions can be converted
into a single action set and a common utility function by merging each buyer’s action sets and the associated utility
functions. So without loss of generality we assume there is a single action set and a common utility function.
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is correlated with the state of the world. The buyers will update his belief about the state of the
world ω after seeing the signal. The seller then post a price for the full revelation of ω. The price
can be different when the buyers see different signal realizations. Formally, the seller can use an
advertising rule defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. An advertising rule 〈S, pi, {ps : s ∈ S}〉 consists of
• a finite set of signals S,
• a signaling scheme pi, which is a random mapping from the support of the state of the world
Ω to the signals S, i.e., pi : Ω→ ∆S,
• and a price menu {ps : s ∈ S}.
When using advertising rule 〈S, pi, {ps : s ∈ S}〉, the seller will first send a signal s ∈ S by the
signaling scheme pi, that is, when the state of the world is ω the seller will send signal s ∈ S with
probability pi(ω, s). Then if the signal that has been sent is s, the seller will charge price ps for the
full revelation of ω.
Example 2.1. In the example of selling flight delay, the seller sends two possible signals
S = {below 6 hours, above 6 hours}
with signaling scheme
pi(ω, below 6 hours) = 1(ω ≤ 6),
pi(ω, above 6 hours) = 1(ω > 6).
Buyer strategy. Consider a buyer with personal belief θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) before seeing the signal
s, then when the signal is realized to s, the posterior belief of the buyer will be
ηs(θ) =
(
θ1pi(1, s), . . . , θnpi(n, s)
)∑n
ω=1 θωpi(ω, s)
. (1)
Then the highest price the buyer is willing to pay for the full revelation of ω will be his expected
loss of not knowing ω based on his posterior belief ηs(θ). We define this expected loss (as a function
of η) as the cost of uncertainty function for the buyer.
Definition 2.2 (Cost of uncertainty). For a decision maker with utility function u(ω, a) and a
belief η = (η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ ∆Ω, the cost of uncertainty is equal to the expected loss of not knowing ω,
C(η) = Eω∼η
[
max
a∈A
u(ω, a)
]
−max
a∈A
Eω∼η[u(ω, a)]
=
n∑
ω=1
ηωmax
a∈A
u(ω, a)−max
a∈A
n∑
ω=1
ηωu(ω, a)
= min
a
Ca(η),
where Ca(η) =
∑n
ω=1 ηω (maxa′∈A u(ω, a
′)− u(ω, a)) is a linear function of η that represents the
expected regret of taking action a. Since C(η) is the minimum of |A| linear functions, C(η) is a
concave function.
So when the signal is realized to s, the buyer will purchase the full revelation of ω if and only if
his expected gain of knowing ω based on his posterior belief is higher than the price, C(ηs(θ)) ≥ ps.
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Mechanism design problem. We assume that the seller knows the utility function u(ω, a),
µ(ω), and the conditional distribution of buyers’ personal beliefs µ(θ|ω).2 We also assume that
the seller will choose and commit to an advertising rule before observing the realization of ω. The
timing is as follows
0. The seller chooses an advertising rule based on µ(ω), µ(θ|ω), u(ω, a) and then posts the ad-
vertising rule.
1. On each day, a new state of the world ω is drawn from µ(ω). Only the seller observes ω.
Some buyers come, with types θ ∼ µ(θ|ω) independently.
2. The seller sends a signal s according to the posted advertising rule and set price ps for the
full revelation of ω.
3. The buyers decide to purchase or not.
The seller’s expected revenue per buyer will then equal∑
ω∈Ω
µ(ω)
∑
θ∈Θ
µ(θ|ω)
∑
s∈S
pi(ω, s) · ps · 1(C(η
s(θ)) ≥ ps),
where ηs(θ) is the type-θ buyer’s posterior belief when receiving s, and C(·) is the cost of uncertainty
function. The seller’s goal is to find an advertising rule that maximizes his expected revenue (per
buyer).
3 Single Buyer Type
We start with the case when the seller targets a single buyer type θ, which applies to, for example,
the case when the majority of the buyers share a common belief. This simplification allows us to
understand the hardness of the problem and gain some insight into the problem.
In this case, we show that finding the optimal advertising rule can be represented as finding
the concave closure of a function, which is NP-hard. However, based on three key properties, we
formulate an exponential-size convex program that computes the optimal advertising rule. When
the size of Ω or the size of A is a constant, the convex program will have a polynomial size. We
also use the three properties to derive some interesting characterization results.
3.1 Concave Closure Formulation
We first formulate our optimal advertising problem as an optimization problem. When the seller
targets a single buyer type θ, the optimal advertising rule can fully extract the expected surplus from
the buyers of that type after sending the signal, i.e., an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi, {ps : s ∈ S}〉
must have ps = C(η
s(θ)) for the targeted type θ. To simplify the notation, we denote by 〈S, pi〉 an
advertising rule, and use ηs to represent the posterior ηs(θ).
2A ubiquitous but controversial assumption in economic theory is the common prior assumption. More specifically,
in models of asymmetric information, it assumes that there is an ex ante stage at which the individuals have identical
information and subsequently update their beliefs in response to private signals. The plausibility of assuming common
priors has been questioned (see [20]) and become conceptually problematic. In this work, we do not assume common
priors always exist, but consider the individuals’ beliefs about the external world to be the primitives of the model.
Nevertheless, the case when a common prior exist is just a special case of our model: the seller and the buyer shares a
common prior distribution µ(ω, θ), where ω is the state of the world and θ represents the buyer’s private observation,
or the buyer’s type. Therefore when the buyer’s type is realized to θ, he will believe that ω follows distribution
µ(ω|θ). This is a special case of our model, in which θ = µ(ω|θ).
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Optimal mechanism formulation. Recall that when the signal is realized to s, the posterior
belief of the buyer is
ηs =
(
θ1pi(1, s), . . . , θnpi(n, s)
)∑n
ω=1 θωpi(ω, s)
. (2)
The optimal mechanism charges the buyer his cost of uncertainty ps = C(η
s) when s is realized.
Define φµ(s) =
∑
ω µωpi(ω, s) to be the probability of sending s. Then the seller’s expected revenue
is equal to
∑
s∈S φµ(s) · C(η
s) and the seller’s optimization problem can be formulated as
max
S,pi
∑
s∈S
φµ(s) · C(η
s) (3)
s.t.
∑
s∈S
pi(ω, s) = 1, ∀ω
pi(ω, s) ≥ 0, ∀ω, s.
Observe that the probability of sending a signal φµ(s) =
∑
ω µωpi(ω, s) depends on the true under-
lying distribution µ but not θ, while C(ηs) depends on the buyer’s belief θ. We show that we can
rewrite φµ(s) as well as the constraints as functions of θ, so that the whole optimization can be
viewed as finding the concave closure of a function f(x) at point θ.
Concave closure representation. Let φθ(s) =
∑
ω θωpi(ω, s) be the probability of receiving s
based on the buyer’s personal belief. The ratio φµ(s)/φθ(s) can be determined as long as we know
the posterior ηs, i.e., we can define the ratio φµ(s)/φθ(s) as a function of η
s,
R(ηs) =
φµ(s)
φθ(s)
=
∑
ω µωpi(ω, s)∑
ω θωpi(ω, s)
=
∑
ω
µω ·
ηsω
θω
.
The last equality is because pi(ω, s)/ (
∑
ω θωpi(ω, s)) = η
s
ω/θω according to (2). We call R(η
s) the
likelihood ratio function. Note that R(ηs) is a linear function of ηs with coefficients µω/θω. Then
the seller’s expected revenue can be represented as the expected product of the likelihood ratio and
the cost of uncertainty, ∑
s∈S
φθ(s) ·R(η
s)C(ηs).
According to (2) and φθ(s) =
∑
ω θωpi(ω, s), we have φθ(s) · η
s =
(
θ1pi(1, s), . . . , θnpi(n, s)
)
. So the
constraints
∑
s∈S pi(ω, s) = 1, pi(ω, s) ≥ 0 can be equivalently written as∑
s∈S
φθ(s) · η
s = θ, φθ(s) ≥ 0, η
s ∈ ∆Ω, ∀s.
Therefore the seller’s problem (3) can be equivalently represented as
max
η, φθ
∑
s∈S
φθ(s) ·R(η
s)C(ηs) (4)
s.t.
∑
s∈S
φθ(s) · η
s = θ
φθ(s) ≥ 0, η
s ∈ ∆Ω, ∀s
Observe that the optimal objective value of (4) is just the value of the concave closure of the
product of the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty f(x) = R(x) · C(x) at position x = θ.
Let’s look at an example.
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Figure 1: An example of concave closure representation. The function in dashed black line is
f(η) = R(η)C(η) for Example 3.1 and the function in gray line is its concave closure f .
Example 3.1. Consider binary state Ω = {0, 1} with µ(0) = µ(1) = 0.5. The buyers face the
problem of guessing the state of the world, so we have u(ω, a) = 1(ω = a) with a ∈ {0, 1}. The
targeted buyers believe that ω = 0 with probability 0.8, i.e. θ(0) = 0.8, θ(1) = 0.2. So the cost of
uncertainty is C(η) = min{η0, 1−η0} and the likelihood ratio is R(η) =
0.5
0.8η0+
0.5
0.2η1. The function
f(η) = R(η)C(η) and its concave closure f is plotted in Figure 1 as a function of η0. So the optimal
expected revenue is f(0.8) = 516 . Since (0.8, f (0.8)) is a convex combination of (0.5, f(0.5)) and
(1, f(1)), the optimal advertising rule sends two possible signals S = {s, t} with ηs = (0.5, 0.5) and
ηt = (1, 0), which leads to
pi(0, s) =
1
4
, pi(0, t) =
3
4
, pi(1, s) = 1, pi(1, t) = 0.
When θ = µ, the likelihood ratio is always equal to one. As a result, the optimal objective
value is the value of the concave closure of f(x) = C(x), which is a concave function. The concave
closure of a concave function is just itself, which means that it is optimal for the seller to not reveal
any partial information, but directly set a price for the full revelation.
Proposition 3.1. When θ = µ, one of the optimal advertising rules for the seller is to not reveal
any partial information and directly charge a price for the full revelation, i.e.
S = {s}, pi(ω, s) = 1 ∀ω.
In more general cases when θ is not necessarily equal to µ, the function f(x) = R(x) · C(x)
is neither concave or convex, and it turns out that the seller’s optimal information advertising
problem (4) is NP-hard.
Theorem 3.1. When the seller targets the buyers of a specific type θ, it is NP-hard to find the
optimal advertising rule (4).
The proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix A.1. Despite the hardness result, in the
following sections, we give some observations about the optimal advertising rule and formulate an
exponential-size convex program that solves this optimization problem.
3.2 Properties of the Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we give some observations about the optimization mechanisms. These observations
are the key building blocks of our main results. Due to the space limit, we only present the
observations informally. The full version can be found in A.2.
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R(η)
C(η)
(a) The points on the two black edges
cannot be decomposed along a direc-
tion with a positive slope. They can
possibly be (R(ηs), C(ηs)) of an opti-
mal advertising rule.
R(η)
C(η)
(b) The points in the gray area can
be decomposed along a direction with
a positive slope. They cannot be
(R(ηs), C(ηs)) for any optimal adver-
tising rule.
Figure 2: An illustration of Lemma 3.2. We plot the ratio of uncertainty (x-coordinate) and the
cost of uncertainty (y-coordinate) of the points η inside polytope Pa. The polygon in the pictures
represents the region Qa = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ Pa}. The two black edges represent the points
that can possibly be (R(ηs), C(ηs)) for some s ∈ S of an optimal advertising rule. The gray area
represents the points that cannot be (R(ηs), C(ηs)) for any s ∈ S of an optimal advertising rule.
First, having a larger set of signals S may help the seller extract more revenue, but we show
that a set of n signals is sufficient for the seller to maximize the expected revenue.
Lemma 3.1. There exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with |S| ≤ n = |Ω|.
The second and the third observations are the necessary conditions for a mechanism to be
optimal, by considering the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty generated by the mechanism.
Recall that the cost of uncertainty C(η) is the minimum of |A| linear functions that represent
the expected regret of taking an action a ∈ A. We can thus divide ∆Ω into |A| polytopes Pa for
a ∈ A, so that when a buyer’s belief falls in Pa, action a will be his best action, i.e.,
Pa = {η ∈ ∆Ω : Ca(η) ≤ Ca′(η),∀a
′}. (5)
Consider plotting the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty of the points in Pa on xy-plane
with x = R(η), y = C(η). Let the region plotted on the xy-plane be
Qa = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ Pa}.
Then the second observation is as follows (illustrated in Figure 2).
Lemma 3.2. Let 〈S, pi〉 be an optimal advertising rule. Consider a single s ∈ S with φθ(s) > 0.
Let ηs be the buyer’s posterior when s is sent. Suppose ηs ∈ Pa. Then the point (R(η
s), C(ηs))
cannot be decomposed along a direction with a positive slope within Qa.
The third observation is about the relative position of points (R(ηs), C(ηs)) for s ∈ S.
Lemma 3.3. An optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 will not send two signals s, t with φθ(s), φθ(t) > 0
that have points (R(ηs), C(ηs)) and (R(ηt), C(ηt)) lying on a line with a negative slope on xy-plane.
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3.3 Optimal Mechanism by Convex Program
With the observations, we compute the optimal advertising rule by an exponential-size convex
program. The key idea is to reduce the design space to a finite set by showing that there exists
an optimal advertising rule with each ηs lying on the segments between the vertices of Pa. Then,
fortunately, by defining variables associated with the segments, the expected revenue is convex.
As we show in Figure 2, point (R(ηs), C(ηs)) for an optimal advertising rule should lie on the
boundary of region Qa. A reasonable conjecture is that ηs also lies on the “boundary” of Pa. We
claim that there exists an optimal advertising rule with each ηs lying on the segments between the
vertices of Pa.
Vertices of C(θ). Define Ha as the set of vertices of the polytope Pa,
Ha =
{
vertices of Pa
}
.
where Pa is defined in (5). We prove that there exists an optimal advertising rule with each η
s
lying on the segments between the vertices in Ha for some a.
Lemma 3.4. There exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 that has each ηs lying on the segments
between the vertices in Ha for some a, i.e., for all s ∈ S,
ηs = β · i+ (1− β) · j with β ∈ [0, 1],
i, j ∈ Ha for some a,
and each ηs = β · i+ (1− β) · j must have
(R(i)−R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0,
and for each pair i, j, there is a unique ηs that lies on the segment between i, j.
The proof is based on Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, which can be found in Appendix A.6.
With Lemma 3.4, we are ready to formulate a convex program to compute the optimal adver-
tising rule. Let G be the set of all possible vertices pairs that can possibly have ηs lying between
them.
G = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ Ha for some a, (R(i) −R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0} .
We represent the posterior ηs lying on the segment between i, j as φθ(s)η
s = φθ(s)(βi+(1−β)j) =
γij · i+ γji · j. Then φθ(s)R(η
s)(ηs) can be represented as
φθ(s)R(η
s)C(ηs) = (γij + γji) ·
γijR(i) + γjiR(j)
γij + γji
·
γijC(i) + γjiC(j)
γij + γji
= γijR(i)C(i) + γjiR(j)C(j) −
γijγji
γij + γji
(R(i)−R(j))(C(i) − C(j)). (6)
For {i, j} that has (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0, (6) is a concave function of (γij , γji), because
γijγji
γij+γji
with negative semidefinite Hessian
H =
1
(γij + γji)3
[
−γ2ji γijγji
γijγji −γ
2
ij
]
is a concave function. So we can rewrite the optimization problem (4) as a convex program as
follows.
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Theorem 3.2. Define G = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ Ha for some a, (R(i) −R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0} . The
following convex program finds an optimal advertising rule
max
∑
{i,j}∈G
γijR(i)C(i) + γjiR(j)C(j) −
γijγji
γij + γji
(R(i)−R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) (7)
s.t.
∑
{i,j}∈G
γij · i+ γji · j = θ
γ ≥ 0
3.4 Computation of the Optimal Mechanism
We have known how to find the optimal advertising rule by a convex program given the vertices Ha
of the polytopes Pa. In this section, we show how to compute the vertices Ha by finding the basic
feasible solutions of the linear equations that defines Pa. In addition, When |A| is a constant or |Ω|
is a constant, Ha will have a polynomial size. So the convex program (7) will have a polynomial
size and the optimal advertising rule can be solved in polynomial time.
To find the vertices of the polytope Pa, we start with the linear constraints that specify Pa.
Recall that Pa ⊆ ∆Ω is the set of posterior beliefs based on which action a is the best action. Pa
can be defined by linear equations with non-negative variables as
‖η‖1 = 1
Ca(η)− Ca′(η) + sa′ = 0, ∀a
′ 6= a (8)
η ≥ 0, sa′ ≥ 0
Variables sa′ are the slack variables that are added to convert inequality constraints Ca(η)−Ca′(η) ≤
0 into equality constraints. Then the vertices of Pa can be found by solving the basic feasible
solutions of (8).
Definition 3.1. Let P be a polytope defined by P = {x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0}, where A is a m × n
matrix with m ≤ n. Without loss of generality we assume rank(A) = m.3 Then a basic feasible
solution is a solution ∈ P with n−m variables set to zero. These n −m zero variables are called
non-basic variables of the solution, and the other m variables are called basic variables.
Lemma 3.5 (Theorem 2.3 in [8]). Let P be a polytope defined by P = {x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0}. Then
x is a vertex of P if and only if x is a basic feasible solution of {x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0}.
We can find all the basic feasible solutions of P = {x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0} as follows. Let B ⊆ [n] be
a set of indices that correspond to m linearly independent columns of the matrix A. We can then
represent matrix A as the concatenation of two matrices A = [AB |AN ] where AB is the m ×m
matrix whose columns are indexed by the indices in B, and AN is the m× (n −m) matrix whose
columns are indexed by the indices in [n] \B. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 (Theorem 2.3 in [8]). For any basic feasible solution x, we have a set B ⊆ [n] of m
indices that correspond to a linearly independent set of columns of A such that: (1) basic variables
xB = A
−1
B b; (2) non-basic variables xN = 0 where N = [n] \ B. In addition, for any set B ⊆ [n]
of m indices that correspond to a linearly independent set of columns, if xB = A
−1
B b ≥ 0 then
(xB , xN = 0) is a basic feasible solution.
3If rank(A) < m, then there exist redundant constraints that can be identified and removed.
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Therefore we can find all the basic feasible solutions by enumerating B ⊆ [n] and computing
xB = A
−1
B b and checking whether xB ≥ 0. In general, there are exponentially many possible B ⊆ [n]
and thus finding all the vertices would take exponential time. However when |A| is a constant or
|Ω| is a constant, the number of possible B would not be very large.
Lemma 3.7. When |A| is a constant or |Ω| is a constant, |Ha| = poly(|Ω|, |A|) for all a.
Proof. Ha, the set of extreme points of the polytope Pa, is the set of the basic feasible solutions of
(8), which contains |A| constraints and |Ω|+|A|−1 variables. So there are at most C(|Ω|+|A|−1, |A|)
basic feasible solutions (which is the number of possible choices of basic variables B). When |Ω| or
|A| is a constant, C(|Ω|+ |A| − 1, |A|) = poly(|Ω|, |A|).
Therefore the problem can be solved efficiently in these two cases. In addition, by Lemma 3.1,
there exists an optimal mechanism with size ≤ n.
Theorem 3.3. When the number of actions |A| is a constant or |Ω| is a constant, we can find an
optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with |S| ≤ n within polynomial time.
Proof. We can first find an optimal advertising rule using the convex program in Theorem 3.2,
which has a polynomial size according to Lemma 3.7. Then we can reduce the size of S to at most
n by the method in Lemma 3.1.
3.5 Characterization for Small Action Set
Now we consider the case when the buyer has a small number of action |A|. According to Theo-
rem 3.3, the optimal advertising rule can be found in polynomial time when |A| is a constant. We
further show that, when |A| is small, there exists an optimal advertising rule that reveals a lot of
information to advertise the (remaining) information.
Theorem 3.4. There exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with |S| ≤ n, in which the seller
reveals ≤ 2|A| possibilities of the realized state of the world ω to the buyer before selling the (re-
maining) information. Formally, for all s ∈ S, the buyer’s posterior ηs has no more than 2|A|
non-zero entries,
‖ηs‖0 ≤ 2|A|.
Proof. Recall that the set of vertices Ha is a subset of the basic feasible solutions of (8). And each
basic feasible solution has |A| non-zero variables, which means that the points in Ha have no more
than |A| non-zero entries. According to Lemma 3.4, there exists an optimal advertising rule with
ηs = β · i+(1−β)j for i, j ∈ Ha, a ∈ A, which means that η
s will not have more than 2|A| non-zero
entries.
When θ = µ, the number of possibilities can be further reduced to |A|.
Proposition 3.2. When θ = µ, there exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with |S| ≤ n,
that reveals ≤ |A| possibilities of the realized state of the world ω to the buyer before selling the
(remaining) information, i.e., for all s ∈ S,
‖ηs‖0 ≤ |A|.
Recall that in this case, it is optimal to not give any advertising information and directly charge
the buyer his expected gain. The proposition shows that the seller can instead give away a lot of
information without hurting the expected revenue. This is because θ can be decomposed into
points in Ha for some a ∈ A without changing the expected revenue. Details can be found in
Appendix A.7.
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Figure 3: Characterization of the optimal advertising rule when the state of the world is binary. We
plot the function C(η1), which is the minimum of |A| linear functions of η1. The optimal advertising
rule must have ηs1 being one of the vertices on one side of η
∗
1 , plotted as black dots in the pictures.
And ηt1 must lie on the other side of η
∗
1 , plotted as black segments in the pictures.
3.6 Characterization for Binary State
In this section, we use the results in the previous sections to give some characterizations of the
optimal advertising rule for the case when the state of the world is binary, i.e. |Ω| = 2. First,
according to Lemma 3.1, there exists an optimal mechanism that only sends two possible signals
to the buyer. In addition, the cost of uncertainty C(η) = C((η1, η2)) = C((η1, 1 − η1)) can be
represented as a function of η1,
C(η1) = min
a
Ca(η)
= min
a
η1 ·∆u(1, a) + (1− η1)∆u(2, a)
= min
a
∆u(2, a) + η1(∆u(1, a) −∆u(2, a))
where ∆u(ω, a) = maxa′ u(ω, a
′) − u(ω, a). So C(η1) is the minimum of |A| linear functions of η1,
as shown in Figure 3. We define vertices of C(η1) to be the turning points of function C(η1), and
let η∗1 = argmaxη1 C(η1) be the maximum point of C(η1). Then we claim the follows.
Theorem 3.5. When |Ω| = 2, there exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with S = {s, t}. The
optimal advertising rule has ηs1 being a vertex of C(η1) on one side of η
∗
1, and η
t
1 lying on the other
side of η∗1, as illustrated in Figure 3. The optimal advertising rule can be solved in O(|A|
2) time.
Proof sketch. First by Lemma 3.1, there exists an optimal advertising rule that has |S| = 2. Let
S = {s, t}. Without loss of generality assume R((1, 0) > R((0, 1)). Then R(η1) is an increasing
function of η1. By Lemma 3.2, the optimal advertising rule should not have η
s
1 or η
t
1 lying on the
left of η∗1 and not being a vertex. By Lemma 3.3, the optimal advertising rule should not have both
ηs1 and η
t
1 on the right of η
∗
1 . Therefore we must have one of η
s
1 and η
t
1 being a vertex on the left of
η∗1 , and the other one on the right of η
∗
1 .
The optimal advertising rule can be solved in O(|A|2) time by enumerating all possibilities of ηs1
and ηt1, and then compute a tangent line of R(η1)C(η1). Details can be found in Appendix A.8.
Corollary 3.1. When |Ω| = 2 and |A| = 2, there exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 that
sends two possible signals S = {s, t}. When the buyer receives signal s, he knows the value of ω
exactly,
pi(1, s) = 0, pi(2, s) ∈ [0, 1] or pi(2, s) = 0, pi(1, s) ∈ [0, 1],
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and the seller charges nothing,
ps = 0.
4 General Problem
We then move to the general problem when the seller faces buyers of different types (i.e. |Θ| > 1)
and the types are drawn from distribution µ(θ|ω). It turns out that the general problem is not
only NP-hard to solve, but also NP-hard to approximate within a constant factor. We thus turn
to some special cases of the problem and give a linear program approximation algorithm for some
special cases of the problem.
4.1 Hardness of the General Problem
In the general problem of optimal advertising, the seller first advertises the information by sending
a signal. Then for each possible realization of the signal, a buyer’s valuation of the remaining
information will follow a distribution that can be inferred by the seller. Based on this distribution,
the seller chooses a best price that will maximize her expected revenue, that is, the price times the
probability that the buyer will make the purchase. The problem is hard in general.
Theorem 4.1. Given the support of the state of the world Ω = {1, . . . , n}, the support of the buyers’
personal beliefs of the state of the world Θ ⊆ ∆Ω and a joint distribution over the two µ(ω, θ), as
well as the buyers’ utility function u(ω, a) for ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A, it is NP-hard to find a constant factor
approximation of the optimal advertising rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue in expectation.
4.2 Approximation for Special Cases
Due to the hardness of the general problem, we investigate some special cases. We show that, for
some special cases when it is not too hard to predict the possible types of buyers who will make
the purchase, it is possible to find an advertising rule with revenue arbitrarily close to the optimal
mechanism within poly(1/ε, |A|, |Ω|, |Θ|) running time, where ε is the upper bound of the difference
between our mechanism and the optimal mechanism.
Suppose now the seller sends a signal s and charges a price ps. Let Λ(s, ps) ⊆ Θ be the set of
buyer types that would pay for the full revelation of ω, i.e.,
Λ(s, ps) ={θ : C(η
s(θ)) ≥ ps} (9)
Let Λ be the set of all possible Λ(s, ps),
Λ = {Λ(s, ps) : s is a signal sent by a signaling scheme pi, ps ∈ R}
For some special cases, the number of possible Λ(s, ps), i.e. |Λ| will not be too large.
• When the type space is relatively small, |Θ| = O(logN) where N = max{|A|, |Ω|}. Then the
number of all possible subsets of Θ is O(N).
• When there is a binary state of the world, i.e. |Ω| = 2. In this case, |Λ| is no more than |Θ|2.
This is because Λ(s, ps) must be a convex set, due to its definition (24) and the concavity of
the cost of uncertainty function C(·). Therefore, denoting θ = (θ1, θ2), the types θ in Λ(s, ps)
must have θ1 lying in an interval [L,R]. Since the type space is discrete, we only need to
consider the intervals with endpoints {θ1 : θ ∈ Θ} to include all Λ(s, ps). The number of such
intervals is no more than |Θ|2. We give the full proof in Appendix B.2.
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We show that if there are only polynomially many possible Λ(s, ps), i.e., |Λ| = poly(|A|, |Ω|, |Θ|),
there exists an approximation algorithm that can approximate the optimal revenue arbitrarily close.
Theorem 4.2. Given Ω = {1, . . . , n}, Θ ⊆ ∆Ω and a joint distribution over the two µ(ω, θ), as well
as the buyers’ utility function u(ω, a) for ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A. If there are only polynomially many possible
Λ(s, ps), i.e., |Λ| = poly(|A|, |Ω|, |Θ|), then there exists an algorithm that for any ε ∈ (0, 1), finds
an advertising rule that achieves expected revenue at least OPT − ε within poly(1/ε, |A|, |Ω|, |Θ|)
running time, where OPT is the expected revenue of the optimal advertising rule.
To prove the theorem, we first show that there exists an optimal advertising rule that has each
signal s mapping to a unique (ps,Λ(s, ps)).
Lemma 4.1. There exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi, {ps : s ∈ S}〉 that satisfy the follows:
for any two different signals s, t ∈ S, either ps 6= pt or Λ(s, ps)) 6= Λ(t, pt)). In other words, each
s ∈ S has a unique (ps,Λ(s, ps)).
We give the proof of the lemma in Appendix B.3. The idea is that if there are two signals with
the same (ps,Λ(s, ps)), we can merge them into one.
Now we formulate an LP to compute an approximately optimal advertising rule. Since we
assume u(ω, a) ∈ [0, 1], the prices charged by the optimal mechanism must lie in [0, 1]. Then we
can approximate the prices by choosing ps from a finite set P = {0, ε, 2ε, . . . , 1} with size ≤ ⌊1/ε⌋+1.
Since the optimal mechanism only needs one signal for each price and each possible Λ(s, ps), we
assign one signal sp,Λ for each pair of p ∈ P and Λ ∈ Λ, so that S = {sp,Λ : p ∈ P,Λ ∈ Λ}. Then
let the variables of the LP be the probability transition function of the signaling scheme pi(ω, sp,Λ)
for all ω ∈ Ω and sp,Λ ∈ S. We add the constraints so that when sp,Λ is sent and the price is set to
p, all the types in Λ will be willing to make the purchase,
C
(
ηsp,Λ(θ)
)
≥ p, ∀p ∈ P,Λ ∈ Λ, θ ∈ Λ.
By the definition of the cost of uncertainty function (Definition 2.2) and the posterior (1), this can
be equivalently represented by linear constraints∑
ω∈Ω
θω · pi(ω, sp,Λ)(u
∗(ω)− u(ω, a)) ≥ p
∑
ω
θω · pi(ω, sp,Λ), ∀p ∈ P,Λ ∈ Λ, θ ∈ Λ. (10)
Then the expected revenue is a linear function of the variables∑
p∈P,Λ∈Λ
p
∑
ω,θ∈Λ
µ(ω, θ)pi(ω, sp,Λ). (11)
Finally we add constraints so that pi(·) is a valid signaling scheme∑
s∈S
pi(ω, s) = 1, ∀ω. pi(ω, s) ≥ 0, ∀ω, s. (12)
The LP with objective (11) and constraints (10) and (12) computes an advertising rule with ex-
pected revenue at least OPT − ε because by rounding the prices of an optimal advertising rule
down to its closest price in P , we get a feasible solution of the LP, and this will not decrease the
expected revenue by more than ε.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have initiated the problem of optimal advertising for information products. We
prove the hardness of the problem and present positive results in both the simple setting and the
general setting. There are many intriguing directions left open for future work.
• The most appealing open problem would probably be how to get around the strong impos-
sibility results. In this work, we have considered general decision problems and arbitrary
distributions. Can one come up with some special but non-trivial utility functions or distri-
butions so that the problem will be tractable? What are the necessary assumptions we need
to add for the problem to be easy?
• For our model of general decision problems and arbitrary distributions, there are also some
interesting open questions. What are the best approximation algorithms we can find for the
general problem? In particular, our hardness result assumes that there is no common prior
between the seller and the buyer. Will the problem still be hard when the buyer and the
seller share a common prior? Does the common prior assumption matter?
• It would also be interesting to extend our model to other problems. For example, in this
work, the seller only cares about the revenue. What if the seller also cares about the buyer’s
action? We have studied the design of the optimal advertising rule when it is decided by the
seller. What if the advertisement is instead provided by a third-party agent? What would
be the best advertising strategy of this third-party advertisement provider, and how would it
affect the social welfare? We’re also not considering the advertising cost. A natural extension
is to incorporate the cost into the model.
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A Single Buyer Type
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
As shown in Section 3.1, the seller’s problem
max
η, φθ
∑
s∈S
φθ(s) ·R(η
s)C(ηs)
s.t.
∑
s∈S
φθ(s) · η
s = θ
φθ(s) ≥ 0, η
s ∈ ∆Ω, ∀s
is equivalent to find the concave closure of f(x) = R(x) · C(x) at a point θ, where R(x) is the
likelihood ratio, and C(x) = mina Ca(y) is the cost of uncertainty. The concave closure of f(x),
denoted by f(x), is equal to
f(x) = min
α,β
{αTx+ β | αT y + β ≥ f(y),∀y ∈ ∆n}. (13)
For simplicity, in this section we allow Ca(y) = c
T
a y to have negative coefficients (by definition,
Ca(y) should always has non-negative coefficients). This is without loss of generality because we
can always equivalently consider C˜a(y) =
∑n
i=1 yi
(
maxa′ Ca′(ei)−Ca(ei)
)
, which is a valid cost of
uncertainty function with non-negative coefficients.
We will introduce a new problem that is closely related to (13). We will prove the hardness of
this new problem and then use it to prove the hardness of (13).
Since the feasible solution (α, β) of (13) forms a convex set, the ellipsoid method can be applied
to solve (13) if there is a cutting-plane oracle that, for any point (α, β), returns a y such that
αT y + β < f(y) if there exists one and returns “feasible” if αT y + β ≥ f(y),∀y. To have such a
cutting-plane oracle, it suffices to solve
max
y∈∆n
f(y)− (αT y + β) = R(y) · C(y)− αT y,
where R(x) =
∑n
i=1 xi ·
µi
θi
is a linear function and C(x) = mina Ca(x) in which Ca(x) is a linear
function of x. This can be solved by solving
max
y∈∆n
{R(y) · Ca(y)− α
T y | Ca(y) ≤ Ca′(y),∀a
′}. (14)
We first show that (14) is hard to solve for specific R(y), Ca(y), α.
Lemma A.1. There exist fixed R(y) = rTy, Ca(y) = c
T
a y, fixed α, and partially fixed C(y), such
that deciding whether the solution of (14) is greater or equal to 0 is NP-complete, and the maximum
must be achieved at point y with
yj ∈ {0, 1/n} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, yn = 1−
n−1∑
j=1
yj.
Proof. We use reduction from the following problem, which is proved to be NP-complete in [21].
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Quadratic programming with one negative eigenvalue [21]. There exist fixed non-negative
vectors γ, β with length n, and partially fixed A, b, so that it is NP-complete to decide whether
max (βT y)2 − γT y (15)
s.t. Ay ≤ b
0 ≤ yi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n].
And the maximum of (15) must be achieved at binary y, i.e., y ∈ {0, 1}n.
We construct an instance of (14) that is equivalent to an instance of (15). We first scale the
variables so that the feasible region is a subset of ∆n. Define x =
1
n
y, we have the following NP-hard
problem,
max (βTx)2 − γTx (16)
s.t. Ax ≤ b
0 ≤ xi ≤
1
n
, ∀i ∈ [n]
where γ, β are non-negative vectors with length n. We add a variable z = 1 −
∑
i xi, so that (16)
is equivalent to
max (βTx)2 − γTx
s.t. Ax ≤ b
0 ≤ xi ≤
1
n
, ∀i ∈ [n]
1Tx+ z = 1.
Then we replace all the constants by their products with 1Tx+ z, which is equal to 1,
max
(x,z)∈∆n+1
(βTx)2 − γTx (17)
s.t. Ax− b
(
1Tx+ z
)
≤ 0
xi −
1
n
(
1Tx+ z
)
≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n].
(17) is an instance of (14) by letting y = (x, z), R(y) = Ca(y) = β
Tx + 0 · z, α = (γ, 0), and
defining a bunch of Ca′(y) so that linear constraints Ca(y)−Ca′(y) ≤ 0 equal the linear constraints
in (17).
We then show that it is hard to solve
max
y∈∆n
{R(y) · C(y)− αT y}. (18)
Lemma A.2. There exist fixed R(y) = rT y, fixed α and partially fixed C(y), such that deciding
whether the solution of (18) is greater or equal to 0 is NP-complete, and the maximum must be
achieved at point y with
yj ∈ {0, 1/n} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, yn = 1−
n−1∑
j=1
yj.
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Proof. We construct an instance of (18) that is equivalent to (14). Suppose we have an instance of
(14)
max
y∈∆n
{R(y) · Ca(y)− α
T y | Ca(y) ≤ Ca′(y),∀a
′}.
We show that we can change Ca′(y) for a
′ 6= a so that the maximum of function R(y)·C(y)−αT y
cannot lie within region
Ca′(y) < Ca(y), i.e., (ca′ − ca)
T y < 0
for any a′. The gradient of R(y) · C(y)− αT y is equal to
∇(R(y) · C(y)− αT y) = C(y) · r +R(y) · ∇C(y)− α.
Consider a point y0 with C(y0) = Ca′(y0), so ∇C(y0) = ca′ and (ca′ − ca)
T y0 < 0. Consider the
projection of y0 to the line (ca′ − ca)
T y = 0. Let the projection be y∗. Then we should have
y∗ − y0 ∝ ca′ − ca. The directional derivative of R(y) · C(y)− α
T y along direction d ∝ ca′ − ca at
this point is equal to
dT (C(y0) · r +R(y0) · ca′ − α) = d
T (Ca′(y0) · r +R(y0) · ca +R(y0)(ca′ − ca)− α)
= (Ca′(y0)d
T r +R(y0)d
T ca − d
Tα)−R(y0)‖ca′ − ca‖
≤ (Ca(y0)d
T r +R(y0)d
T ca − d
Tα)−R(y0)‖ca′ − ca‖. (19)
Note that we can increase ‖ca′ − ca‖ by a factor of k without changing ca and region {y : Ca′(y) <
Ca(y)} (or equivalently the direction of ca′ − ca) by replacing ca′ with
c˜a′ = k(ca′ − ca) + ca
so that c˜a′ − ca = k(ca′ − ca). Since R(y0) = r
Ty0 ≥ mini{ri} is bounded from below by a positive
constant, we can choose k that is large enough so that the directional derivative (19) is negative
for all the points between y0 and y
∗, which means that R(y0)C(y0)− α
T y0 < R(y
∗)C(y∗)− αT y∗.
So y0 cannot be the maximum point.
So we replace ca′ with c˜a′ for all a
′ 6= a to get the new cost of uncertainty function C˜(y) so that
the maximum
max
y∈∆n
{R(y) · C˜(y)− αT y}
cannot lie in region
Ca′(y) < Ca(y), i.e., (ca′ − ca)
T y < 0
for any a′, which is thus equal to
max
y∈∆n
{R(y) · Ca(y)− α
T y | Ca(y) ≤ Ca′(y),∀a
′}
Finally we prove that Problem (18)
max
y∈∆n
{R(y) · C(y)− αT y} = max
y∈∆n
{f(y)− αT y}
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whose maximum must be achieved at point y with
yj ∈ {0, 1/n} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, yn = 1−
n−1∑
j=1
yj (20)
is polynomial-time reducible to the seller’s problem of finding concave closure f at a point (13).
First by the definition of concave closure, it holds that
max
y∈∆n
{f(y)− αT y} = max
y∈∆n
{f(y)− αT y}.
So to solve (18), we only need to find the maximum of concave function f(y)− αT y at points that
satisfy (20). If we have an oracle that solves the concave closure f(y) defined in (13), then we can
use the ellipsoid method to find the maximum of f(y)− αT y. When we know the maximum point
must have (20) and only need to find the maximum at points with (20), the ellipsoid method can
terminate within polynomially many iterations, by the same arguments as in [16]. Therefore the
NP-hard problem (18) is polynomial-time reducible to finding the concave closure f . Therefore the
seller’s optimal information advertising problem is NP-hard.
A.2 Properties of the Optimal Mechanism: Full Version
In this section, we give some observations about the optimization mechanism. Some of the obser-
vations are similar to the ones in [22] in which they have simpler decision variables and valuation
functions.
The first observation (Lemma A.3) is that there exists an optimal mechanism with |S| ≤ n = |Ω|.
The second and the third observations (Lemma A.4 and Lemma A.5)are the necessary conditions
for a mechanism to be optimal, by considering the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty
generated by the mechanism.
First, having a larger set of signals S may help the seller extract more revenue, but we show
that a set of n signals is sufficient for the seller to maximize the expected revenue.
Lemma A.3. There exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with |S| ≤ n = |Ω|.
We give the proof of the lemma in Appendix A.3. The idea of the proof is that for any optimal
mechanism with |S| > n, we can replace one of the signals with a convex combination of the others,
so that |S| can be decreased by one.
Second, an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 should not have an ηs that can be decomposed
ηs = αη(1) + (1− α)η(2) to strictly increase the expected revenue
R(ηs)C(ηs) < αR(η(1))C(η(1)) + (1− α)R(η(2))C(η(2)).
So R(ηs)C(ηs) should be locally concave. Let’s look at function R(ηs)C(ηs). The likelihood ratio
R(ηs) is a linear function of ηs, and the cost of uncertainty C(ηs) = mina Ca(η
s) is a piece-wise
linear function of ηs. Let Pa = {η : Ca(η) ≤ Ca′(η),∀a
′} be the region in which C(η) = Ca(η) is
a linear function. We consider the local convexity/concavity of R(ηs)C(ηs) within Pa. Notice the
following fact.
Fact A.1. Function g(x, y) = x · y with Hessian matrix
H =
[
0 1
1 0
]
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R(η)
C(η)
(a) The points on the two black edges
cannot be decomposed along a direc-
tion with a positive slope. They can
possibly be (R(ηs), C(ηs)) of an opti-
mal advertising rule.
R(η)
C(η)
(b) The points in the gray area can
be decomposed along a direction with
a positive slope. They cannot be
(R(ηs), C(ηs)) for any optimal adver-
tising rule.
Figure 4: An illustration of Lemma A.4. We plot the ratio of uncertainty (x-coordinate) and the
cost of uncertainty (y-coordinate) of the points η inside polytope Pa. The polygon in the pictures
represents the region Qa = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ Pa}. The two black edges represent the points
that can possibly be (R(ηs), C(ηs)) for some s ∈ S of an optimal advertising rule. The gray area
represents the points that cannot be (R(ηs), C(ηs)) for any s ∈ S of an optimal advertising rule.
is strictly convex along a direction d = (dx, dy) with a positive slope dxdy > 0, i.e., for any point
(x0, y0), function
h(t) = g(x0 + tdx, y0 + tdy)
is strictly convex when dxdy > 0. Because the second directional derivative of g in the direction d
at any point (x0, y0) is equal to
dTHd = 2dxdy > 0.
For the same reason, g(x, y) is strictly concave along a direction d = (dx, dy) with a negative slope
dxdy < 0.
Consider x = R(ηs), y = C(ηs) and g(x, y) = R(ηs)C(ηs). Then for two-dimensional points
{(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ Pa}, we should have the following lemma (illustrated in Figure 4).
Lemma A.4. Let 〈S, pi〉 be an optimal advertising rule. Consider a single s ∈ S with φθ(s) > 0. Let
ηs be the buyer’s posterior when s is sent. Suppose ηs ∈ Pa. Define Qa = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ Pa}
as the region on xy-plane that represents the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty of the points
in Pa. Then the point (R(η
s), C(ηs)) cannot be decomposed along a direction with a positive slope
within Qa, that is, there cannot exist η
(1), η(2) ∈ Pa with
ηs = αη(1) + (1− α)η(2), α ∈ (0, 1)
and
(R(ηs)−R(η(1)))(C(ηs)− C(η(1))) > 0.
Third, an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 should not have two ηs, ηt with s, t ∈ S that can be
merged into one signal
ηr =
φθ(s)
φθ(s) + φθ(t)
ηs +
φθ(t)
φθ(s) + φθ(t)
ηt (21)
to strictly increase the expected revenue. We prove the follows.
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Lemma A.5. The optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 should not send two signals s, t ∈ S with
φθ(s), φθ(t) > 0 that have
(R(ηs)−R(ηt))(C(ηs)− C(ηt)) < 0.
The omitted full proof can be found in Appendix A.4 and A.5.
A.3 Proof of Lemma A.3
Let 〈S, pi〉 be an optimal advertising rule. Suppose S = {s1, . . . , sk} with k > n. For simplicity, we
write η(i) = ηsi as the posterior when si is received, and φ
(i) = φθ(si) as the probability of receiving
s based on the buyer’s belief θ. WLOG assume φ(i) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since k > n we must
have η(1), . . . , η(k) linearly dependent. So there exists non-zero vector α with
α1η
(1) + · · ·+ αkη
(k) = 0.
WLOG assume α1 6= 0. Then
η(1) = −
α2
α1
η(2) − · · · −
αk
α1
η(k).
We can then try to reduce the size of S by substituting η(1) with −α2
α1
η(2) − · · · − αk
α1
η(k), that is,
reducing φ(1) by δ and increasing other φ(i) by − αi
α1
δ. This will not violate the constraints of (4).
We increase the value of δ until one of φ(i) reaches 0 and that signal can be removed from S.
Since we are considering an optimal advertising rule, we must have the value of f(x) = R(x)C(x)
satisfying
f(η(1)) = −
α2
α1
f(η(2))− · · · −
αk
α1
f(η(k)),
otherwise we can substitute one of η(1) and −α2
α1
η(2)− · · · − αk
α1
η(k) with another to strictly increase
the objective value without violating the constraints. Therefore as long as k > n, we can reduce
the size of S by one without violating the constraints or changing the objective value.
A.4 Proof of Lemma A.4
Suppose there exist η(1), η(2) ∈ Pa with η
s = αη(1) + (1 − α)η(2) and (R(ηs) − R(η(1)))(C(ηs) −
C(η(1))) > 0. Since both R(η) and C(η) are linear functions within Pa, we should have
(R(ηs), C(ηs)) = α(R(η(1)), C(η(1))) + (1− α)(R(η(2)), C(η(2))),
and (R(ηs), C(ηs)), (R(η(1)), C(η(1))), (R(η(2)), C(η(2))) lying on a line with a positive slope. Since
function g(x, y) = xy is strictly convex along a direction with positive slope, decomposing ηs into
αη(1)+(1−α)η(2) should strictly increase the objective value of (4), which contradicts the optimality
of the advertising rule.
A.5 Proof of Lemma A.5
The idea is as follows. Consider merging s and t into one single r so that
ηr = αηs + (1− α)ηt, α ∈ (0, 1)
as in (21). First assuming that C(η) is a linear function of η, then we should have
(
R(ηs), C(ηs)
)
,(
R(ηr), C(ηr)
)
,
(
R(ηt), C(ηt)
)
lying on a line with a negative slope. Since g(x, y) = xy is a strictly
24
concave function along a direction with a negative slope, merging s and t should lead to a higher
objective value assuming C(·) is linear,
R(ηr)(αC(ηs) + (1− α)C(ηt)) > αR(ηs)C(ηs) + (1− α)R(ηt)C(ηt).
When C(·) is concave but not linear, the gap will only be larger as C(ηr) ≥ αC(ηs)+ (1−α)C(ηt).
So merging s and t will still increase the objective value,
R(ηr)C(ηr) ≥ R(ηr)(αC(ηs) + (1− α)C(ηt)) > αR(ηs)C(ηs) + (1− α)R(ηt)C(ηt),
which contradicts the optimality of the advertising rule.
One can compute the follows. Consider merging two signals, that is, having a new signal v with
pi(ω, v) = pi(ω, s) + pi(ω, t), ∀ω.
It is easy to verify that
φθ(v) = φθ(s) + φθ(t),
ηv =
φθ(s)
φθ(v)
· ηs +
φθ(t)
φθ(v)
· ηt,
R(ηv) =
φθ(s)
φθ(v)
·R(ηs) +
φθ(t)
φθ(v)
· R(ηt).
Then the change of the expected revenue when merging s and t is equal to
φθ(v)R(η
v)C(ηv)− φθ(s)R(η
s)C(ηs)− φθ(t)R(η
t)C(ηt)
=
(
φθ(s) · R(η
s) + φθ(t) · R(η
t)
)
C(ηv)− φθ(s)R(η
s)C(ηs)− φθ(t)R(η
t)C(ηt). (22)
Since C(·) is a concave function, we have
C(ηv) = C
(
φθ(s)
φθ(v)
· ηs +
φθ(t)
φθ(v)
· ηt
)
≥
φθ(s)
φθ(v)
· C(ηs) +
φθ(t)
φθ(v)
· C(ηt). (23)
Combining (22) and (A.5), we know that the change of the expected revenue is no less than
(
φθ(s) · R(η
s) + φθ(t) · R(η
t)
)(φθ(s)
φθ(v)
· C(ηs) +
φθ(t)
φθ(v)
· C(ηt)
)
− φθ(s)R(η
s)C(ηs)− φθ(t)R(η
t)C(ηt)
=
(
φθ(s)R(η
s) + φθ(t)R(η
t)
) (
φθ(s)C(η
s) + φθ(t)C(η
t)
)
− φθ(s)φθ(v)R(η
s)C(ηs)− φθ(t)φθ(v)R(η
t)C(ηt)
φθ(v)
=
φθ(s)φθ(t)
φθ(v)
·
(
R(ηs)C(ηt) +R(ηt)C(ηs)−R(ηs)C(ηs)−R(ηt)C(ηt)
)
=−
φθ(s)φθ(t)
φθ(v)
·
(
R(ηs)−R(ηt)
)(
C(ηs)− C(ηt)
)
>0.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3.4
We first restate some notations.
Pa = {η : Ca(η) ≤ Ca′(η),∀a
′}
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is the polytope in which action a is always the best action and C(θ) = Ca(θ) is linear. Ha is the
set of vertices of the polytope Pa, Define Qa = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ Pa}.
We prove that there exists an optimal advertising rule with each ηs lying on the segments
between the vertices in Ha for some a.
Consider an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 and a signal s ∈ S with φθ(s) > 0. Suppose η
s lies
in Pa, then η
s can be represented as a convex combination of the vertices of the polytope,
ηs =
∑
i∈Ha
qi · i.
Let T ⊆ Ha be the set of vertices i that has qi > 0. If |T | ≤ 2, then the lemma is proved. Otherwise
we claim the follows.
Claim A.1. The points {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T} in two-dimensional space, which represent the
likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty of i ∈ T , must lie on a line with a nonpositive slope.
If the points {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T} does not lie on a line with a nonpositive slope, there are two
possibilities,
1. the points lie on a line with a positive slope,
2. the points do not lie on a line.
In both of the cases, we can decompose (R(ηs), C(ηs)) along a direction d with positive slope (as
shown in Figure 5).
• In Case (1), when {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T} lie on a line with a positive slope, suppose (R(l), C(l))
with l ∈ T is one of the endpoints of segment Qa. Since η
s =
∑
i∈Ha
qi · i and qi ∈ (0, 1) for
all i, there exists small enough ε so that
ηs + ε(l − ηs) ∈ Pa
ηs − ε(l − ηs) = (ql + (ql − 1)ε)l +
∑
i 6=l
(1 + ε)qi · i ∈ Pa
Therefore ηs can be decomposed as
ηs =
1
2
(ηs + ε(l − ηs)) +
1
2
(ηs − ε(l − ηs)).
• In Case (2), there must exist a convex combination l =
∑
i∈T wi ·i so that (R(l)−R(η
s))(C(l)−
C(ηs)) > 0. Again there must exist small enough ε such that
ηs + ε(l − ηs) ∈ Pa
ηs − ε(l − ηs) =
∑
i∈T
(qi + ε(qi − wi)) · i ∈ Pa
Then ηs can be decomposed as
ηs =
1
2
(ηs + ε(l − ηs)) +
1
2
(ηs − ε(l − ηs)).
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(R(ηs), C(ηs))
R(η)
C(η)
(a) {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } lie on a line
with a positive slope. The gray seg-
ment is the region Qa.
(R(ηs), C(ηs))
R(η)
C(η)
(b) {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } do not lie on
a line. The gray polygon is Qa.
Figure 5: An illustration for Claim A.1. Two cases when {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T} do not lie on
a line with a nonpositive slope. The big black point represents (R(ηs), C(ηs)), and the small
black points are (R(i), C(i)) for i ∈ T . (R(ηs), C(ηs)) is a convex combination of the points
{(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T}, with positive coefficients. In both of the cases, (R(ηs), C(ηs)) can be
decomposed along a direction with a positive slope.
Therefore according to Lemma A.4, both of the cases cannot be true for an optimal mechanism.
Based on Claim A.1, we know that {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T} must lie on a line with a nonpositive
slope. Then we show that if |T | > 2, we can decompose signal s to a bunch of signals that
have η lying on segments between vertices. More specifically, we can decompose ηs into a convex
combination of some points with the same likelihood ratio and cost of uncertainty,
ηs = α1η
(1) + α2η
(2) + · · ·+ αkη
(k).
with each point η(l) = β · i+(1− β) · j for some i, j ∈ T and (R(η(l)), C(η(l))) = (R(ηs), C(ηs)), for
1 ≤ l ≤ k. We find η(1), η(2), . . . , η(k) by repeating the following process
• At step l, let i∗, j∗ ∈ T be the two endpoints on the segment of {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T}. Then
there exists β∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that β∗(R(i∗), C(i∗)) + (1− β∗)(R(j∗), C(j∗)) = (R(ηs), C(ηs)).
• Let η(l) = β∗ · i∗ + (1− β∗) · j∗, αl = min{qi∗/β
∗, qj∗/(1 − β
∗)}. WLOG assume αl = qi∗/β
∗.
• ηs ← ηs − αlη
(l), T ← T \ {i∗}.
At each step, we find an η(l) and reduce the size of T at least by one. Repeat this process until
|T | ≤ 2, we find an advertising rule that has each posterior lying on the segments between i, j ∈
T ⊆ Ha. All the points i ∈ T have (R(i), C(i)) lying on a line with a nonpositive slope, so we have
(R(i∗)−R(j∗))(C(i∗)− C(j∗)) ≤ 0 for all i∗, j∗.
It remains to prove that for each pair i, j, there is a unique ηs lying on the segment between i, j.
Suppose there are two posteriors ηs, ηt lying on the segment between i, j with (R(i)−R(j))(C(i)−
C(j)) ≤ 0. If (R(i)−R(j))(C(i)−C(j)) < 0, then by Lemma A.5, we must have (R(ηs), C(ηs)) =
(R(ηt), C(ηt)). So we can merge s and t into one signal without changing the objective value. If
(R(i)−R(j))(C(i)−C(j)) = 0, then either R(ηs) = R(ηt) or C(ηs) = C(ηt). In both of the cases,
merging s and t will not decrease the objective value as R(·) is a linear function and C(·) is a
concave function.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We prove that when θ = µ, there exists an optimal advertising rule that reveals ≤ |A| possibilities
of the realized state of the world ω to the buyer before selling the (remaining) information. Recall
that in this case, the optimal advertising problem is equivalent to finding the concave closure of
f(x) = C(x),
max
η, φθ
∑
s∈S
φθ(s) · C(η
s)
s.t.
∑
s∈S
φθ(s) · η
s = θ
φθ(s) ≥ 0, η
s ∈ ∆Ω, ∀s
The optimal objective value is C(θ) being achieved at
S = {s}, ηs = θ, φθ(s) = 1.
which means is optimal to not give any advertising information and directly charge the buyer his
expected gain. We show that ηs = θ can be decomposed into points in Ha for some a ∈ A without
changing the expected revenue. Assume that θ ∈ Pa, then θ can be decomposed into a convex
combination of the vertices in Ha,
θ =
∑
i∈Ha
qi · i.
Since C(x) is linear within Pa, we can decompose θ into
∑
i∈Ha
as
S = {si : i ∈ Ha}, η
si = i, φθ(si) = qi,
and the objective function value remains unchanged
∑
si∈S
φθ(s)C(η
s) =
∑
i∈Ha
qiC(i) = C
(∑
i∈Ha
qi
)
= C(θ)
The vertices in Ha has no more than |A| non-zero entries by Definition 3.1 and Lemma 3.5. Finally
we can decrease the number of signals |S| to ≤ n by the same method in the proof of Lemma A.3.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 3.5
We prove that when |Ω| = 2, there exists an optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi〉 with S = {s, t}. The
optimal advertising rule has ηs1 being a vertex of C(η1) on one side of η
∗
1 , and η
t
1 lying on the other
side of η∗1 , as illustrated in Figure 6. The optimal advertising rule can be solved in O(|A|
2) time.
First by Lemma A.3, there exists an optimal advertising rule that has |S| = 2. Let S = {s, t}.
Without loss of generality assume R((1, 0) > R((0, 1)). Then R(η1) is an increasing function of η1.
By Lemma A.4, the optimal advertising rule should not have ηs1 or η
t
1 lying on the left of η
∗
1 and
not being a vertex. By Lemma A.5, the optimal advertising rule should not have both ηs1 and η
t
1
on the right of η∗1. Therefore we must have one of η
s
1 and η
t
1 being a vertex on the left of η
∗
1, and
the other one on the right of η∗1 .
We then show how to compute the the optimal mechanism in O(|A|2) time. Assume that ηs1 is
on the left of η∗1 and η
t
1 is on the right of η
∗
1 . We enumerate all possibilities of η
s
1, i.e., the vertices
on the left of η∗1 , and all the linear segments on the right of η
∗
1 that η
t
1 lies in. Denote the linear
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0 1η
∗
1
η
s
1 η
t
1
η1
C(η1)
Figure 6: Characterization of the optimal advertising rule when the state of the world is binary. We
plot the function C(η1), which is the minimum of |A| linear functions of η1. The optimal advertising
rule must have ηs1 being one of the vertices on one side of η
∗
1 , plotted as black dots in the pictures.
And ηt1 must lie on the other side of η
∗
1 , plotted as black segments in the pictures.
segment by [l, r]. Then f(η1) = R(η1)C(η1) should be a concave quadratic function of η1 in interval
[l, r]. Then our problem is equivalent to finding the concave closure of point (ηs1, f(η
s
1)) and function
f(η1) on segment [l, r]. This is equivalent to finding the tangent line of f(η1) on segment [l, r] that
goes through point (ηs1, f(η
s
1)). The tangent point (η
t
1, f(η
t
1)) is either at the endpoints l, r, or has
(f(ηt1)− f(η
s
1), η
t
1 − η
s
1) ∝ (f
′(ηt1), 1)
which is easy to solve and verify.
B General Problem
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove Theorem 4.1 by reduction from the AlmostColoring problem from [18]:
For any constant ε ∈ (0, 12 ], and positive integers k and q such that q ≥ 2
k +1, given a graph
G(V,E), it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
YES Case: There are q disjoint independent sets V1, . . . , Vq ⊆ V , such that |Vi| = (1− ε)
|V |
q
for i = 1, . . . , q.
NO Case: There is no independent set in G of size |V |
qk+1
.
For any instance of AlmostColoring, we construct an optimal information advertising problem
whose solution can be used to distinguish the YES Case and the NO Case. Let the state of the
world be one of the vertices, i.e., Ω = V and n = |V |. The buyer can possibly have |V | different
prior beliefs Θ = {θ(v) : v ∈ V }. The buyer with prior belief θ(v) initially thinks that ω is highly
likely to be one of the neighbors of v: for some constant C
θ
(v)
j = C, for j ∈ V \ N (v),
θ
(v)
i = qn · C, for i ∈ N (v),
where N (v) is the set of the neighboring vertices of v (not including v). For simplicity, we call a
buyer with prior belief θ(v) a type-v buyer. Assume both the state of the world ω and the buyer’s
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prior θ are uniformly distributed, and ω and θ are independent, i.e., µ(ω, θ) = µ(ω)µ(θ) = 1
n
· 1
n
for ω ∈ Ω = V and θ ∈ Θ = {θ(v) : v ∈ V }. The buyer can take 2|V | actions A = {H(v) : v ∈
V }∪{L(v) : v ∈ V }. Let d = (1−ε) |V |
q
be the size of the subsets in the YES Case. When the buyer
takes H(v), he will have utility M when the state of the world is realized to v, and have slightly
lower utility M − M
d−1 when the state of the world is not v, i.e.,
u(v,H(v)) =M, u(j,H(v)) =M −
M
d− 1
for j 6= v.
When the buyer takes L(v), he will have zero utility when the state of the world is realized to v
and otherwise have utility M , i.e.,
u(v, L(v)) = 0, u(j, L(v)) =M for j 6= v.
Then we claim the follows.
Claim B.1. In the YES Case, there exists a mechanism that achieves expected revenue ≥ M
n
. In
the NO Case, there exists no mechanism that has expected revenue > 2M
qn
.
We first show that in the YES Case, there exists a mechanism that has expected revenue M
n
.
Consider the signaling scheme that reveals which independent set ω belongs to, i.e., there are q
possible signals S = {s1, . . . , sq} and
pi(ω, si) =
{
1, if ω ∈ Vi
0, otherwise
Because Vi is an independent set, for any vertex v ∈ Vi, the posterior of a type-v buyer after
receiving si is the uniform distribution over Vi. It is then easy to verify that for any type-v buyer
with v ∈ Vi, the cost of uncertainty equals
M
d
after receiving si. So if the seller sets a price
M
d
,
at least |Vi||V | =
d
n
portion of the buyers will pay for the full revelation of ω after receiving si. This
holds for all si ∈ S. Therefore the seller can have at least
M
d
· d
n
= M
n
expected revenue.
We then show that in the NO Case, there exists no mechanism that has expected revenue
> M
qn
. Let’s consider an arbitrary mechanism that first sends a signal s ∈ S using signaling scheme
pi : Ω → ∆S, and then sets price ps if the signal s is realized. Let V
(s) be the set of buyer types
who will pay for the full revelation of ω after observing s,
V (s) = {v : the buyer with prior belief θ(v) will pay ps after observing s}.
Let’s consider two possibilities: (1) V (s) is an independent set; (2) V (s) contains an edge (i, j).
(1) If V (s) is an independent set, then it holds that
• |V (s)| ≤ |V |
qk+1
because of the NO Case condition.
• ps ≤
M
d
. This is because for any probability distribution of the state of the world, η ∈ ∆Ω,
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the cost of uncertainty is bounded by M/d. More specifically,
C(η) =
n∑
ω=1
ηωmax
a∈A
u(ω, a)−max
a∈A
n∑
ω=1
ηωu(ω, a)
= M −max
i
max
{
n∑
ω=1
ηωu(ω,H
(i)),
n∑
ω=1
ηωu(ω,L
(i))
}
= M −max
i
max
{
ηiM + (1− ηi)(M −
M
d− 1
), (1− ηi)M
}
= min
i
min
{
(1− ηi)
M
d− 1
, ηiM
}
≤ min
{(
1−
1
d
)
M
d− 1
,
1
d
·M
}
=
M
d
.
Therefore the seller’s expected revenue conditioning on sending s is no more than 1
qk+1
· M
d
=
M
nqk(1−ε)
≤ 2M
nqk
.
(2) If V (s) contains an edge (i, j), then we claim that ps cannot exceed
M
qn
. By the definition of
θ(i) and θ(j), we have
θ
(i)
j = qn · θ
(i)
i , θ
(j)
i = qn · θ
(j)
j .
WLOG assume pi(i, s) ≤ pi(j, s). Denote by η(i) the posterior of a type-i buyer after receiving s,
then we should have
η
(i)
i
η
(i)
j
=
θ
(i)
i
θ
(i)
j
·
pi(i, s)
pi(j, s)
≤
1
qn
.
And since η
(i)
j ≤ 1, it holds that
η
(i)
i ≤
1
qn
,
which means the type-i buyer will believe that the probability of the state of the world ω being i
is no more than 1
qn
after observing s. Then the type-i buyer will not pay more than
C(η(i)) =
n∑
ω=1
η(i)ω max
a∈A
u(ω, a) −max
a∈A
n∑
ω=1
η(i)ω u(ω, a)
= M −max
a∈A
n∑
ω=1
η(i)ω u(ω, a)
≤ M −
n∑
ω=1
η(i)ω u(ω,L
(i))
≤
M
qn
.
for the full revelation of ω, which means ps ≤
M
qn
. Therefore the seller’s expected revenue condi-
tioning on sending s is no more than M
qn
.
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In both of the cases, the seller’s expected revenue conditioning on sending s is no more than 2M
qn
.
This holds for all s. Therefore in the NO Case, the expected revenue of any mechanism ≤ 2M
qn
. For
any constant c, by setting q = 2c2, Claim B.1 implies that it is NP-hard to find c-approximation of
the optimal mechanism.
B.2 Efficient Approximation for Binary State
Recall that Λ(s, ps) ⊆ Θ is the set of buyer types that would pay for the full revelation of ω, i.e.,
Λ(s, ps) ={θ : C(η
s(θ)) ≥ ps} (24)
Let Λ be the set of all possible Λ(s, ps),
Λ = {Λ(s, ps) : s is a signal sent by a signaling scheme pi, ps ∈ R}
We show that when there is a binary state of the world, i.e. |Ω| = 2, |Λ| is no more than |Θ|2. This
is because
Λ(s, ps) ={θ : C(η
s(θ)) ≥ ps}
must be a convex set. By definition, the posterior belief of a type-θ buyer after receiving a signal
s is equal to
ηs(θ) =
(
θ1pi(1, s), . . . , θnpi(n, s)
)∑n
ω=1 θωpi(ω, s)
.
And the cost of uncertainty function
C(η) = Eω∼η
[
max
a∈A
u(ω, a)
]
−max
a∈A
Eω∼η[u(ω, a)]
=
n∑
ω=1
ηωmax
a∈A
u(ω, a)−max
a∈A
n∑
ω=1
ηωu(ω, a)
= min
a
Ca(η)
is the minimum of |A| linear functions. Although the cost of uncertainty function is defined on ∆Ω,
we can naturally extend the domain to [0, 1]n so that
C(kη) = kC(η).
Then we have
C(ηs(θ)) ≥ ps
⇐⇒ C
(
θ1pi(1, s), . . . , θnpi(n, s)
)
≥ ps
n∑
ω=1
θωpi(ω, s).
The left hand side C(θ1pi(1, s), . . . , θnpi(n, s)) is a concave function of θ, and the right hand side
ps
∑n
ω=1 θωpi(ω, s) is a linear function of θ. Therefore, Λ(s, ps) = {θ : C(η
s(θ)) ≥ ps} must be a
convex set. Denote θ = (θ1, θ2). Since Λ(s, ps) is a convex set, the types θ in Λ(s, ps) must have θ1
lying in an interval [L,R]. Then as the type space is discrete, we only need to consider the intervals
with endpoints {θ1 : θ ∈ Θ} to include all Λ(s, ps). The number of such intervals is no more than
|Θ|2.
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Consider an arbitrary optimal advertising rule 〈S, pi, {ps : s ∈ S}〉. Suppose there exist two signals
s, t ∈ S with (ps,Λ(s, ps)) = (pt,Λ(t, pt)). Then we can merge s, t into one signal s
′ as follows
pi(ω, s′) = pi(ω, s) + pi(ω, t) for all ω
ps′ = ps = pt.
Then according to (1), for any buyer of type θ ∈ Λ(s, ps) = Λ(t, pt), his posterior after seeing s
′ is
ηs
′
(θ) =
1∑n
ω=1 θω(pi(ω, s) + pi(ω, t))
(
ηs(θ)
n∑
ω=1
θωpi(ω, s) + η
t(θ)
n∑
ω=1
θωpi(ω, t)
)
= kηs(θ) + (1 − k)ηt(θ).
Since the cost of uncertainty function is concave,
C
(
ηs
′
(θ)
)
≥ k · C
(
ηs(θ)
)
+ (1− k) · C
(
ηt(θ)
)
≥ kps + (1− k)pt = ps′.
So the buyer will still be willing to pay ps′ . The expected revenue will not decrease.
C Optimal Information Disclosure
[22] studies the following problem. There is a sender endowed with a prospect, which is randomly
drawn from a finite set P = {1, . . . , N}. The probability of i being realized is pi > 0 and
∑n
i=1 pi =
1. Each i ∈ P is characterized by its payoffs (pii, vi) ∈ R
2, where pii is the prospect’s profitability
for the sender, and vi is its value to the receiver.
The sender chooses a disclosure rule 〈σ, S〉 to send a signal s ∈ S drawn from σ(i) to the
receiver. The receiver observes the signal s, and decides whether to “accept” (a = 1) or “ not
accept” (a = 0). The receiver forgoes an outside option worth r ∈ R, which is a random variable
independent of i. So the sender’s payoff is a · pi and the receiver’s payoff is a(v − r).
Assume v ∈ [0, 1] and r ∼ U [0, 1]. Then the sender’s expected payoff is
Es
(
E[pi|s] · E[v|s]
)
=
∑
s
(∑
i
piσ(i, s)
) ∑
i piσ(i, s)pii∑
i piσ(i, s)
·
∑
i piσ(i, s)vi∑
i piσ(i, s)
. (25)
Optimal Information Disclosure as Optimal Advertising. Consider a Optimal Advertising
problem with common buyer prior. Let the state of the world be the realization of the prospect,
Ω = P . Let the buyer’s common prior equal to the probability distribution of the prospect, i.e.,
θi = pi. And let the true underlying distribution µ satisfy
µi
θi
∝ pii, i.e.,
µi
θi
= pii ·M where M is a
constant so that
∑
i θipii ·M = 1. Finally let the cost of uncertainty be the expected value of the
prospect, i.e., C(θ) = Eθ[v] =
∑n
i=1 θivi.
4 Then it is easy to verify that (25) is equivalent to the
4This is not really a valid cost of uncertainty function, as C(ei) 6= 0 for ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0). But our
algorithm still works when the cost of uncertainty is a linear function.
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optimal advertising problem (3) with a constant factor difference in the objective function,
∑
s
(∑
i
piσ(i, s) ·
∑
i piσ(i, s)pii∑
i piσ(i, s)
)∑
i piσ(i, s)vi∑
i piσ(i, s)
=
∑
s
(∑
i
θiσ(i, s)pii
)∑
i θiσ(i, s)vi∑
i θiσ(i, s)
=
∑
s
(∑
i
θiσ(i, s) ·
µi
θi
/M
)
C(θs)
=
1
M
∑
s
(∑
i
µiσ(i, s)
)
C(θs).
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